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In this note, we formulate a condition describing the vulnerability of a social choice
function to a specic kind of strategic behavior and show that two well known classes of
choice functions suer from it.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of voting paradoxes is one of the oldest pastimes of social choice theorists (Nurmi
(1999)). Voting paradoxes are counteruintuitive, unexpected or unpleasant surprises in voting
and elections. The outcomes sound bizarre, unfair or otherwise implausible, given the expressed
opinions of voters. Typically, they suggest that something is wrong with the way individual
opinions are being processed in voting. Voting paradoxes have an important role in the history
of social choice theory.
The new paradox reported in this note is motivated by a puzzle formulated by Nalebu
(1988). In elections (either committees or mass elections) it is often the case that a voter
who cannot participate in the election is permitted to transfer his vote to another voter. This
choice is an alternative to abstention. Depending upon context, such a voter may need to
explain/report the reasons for which he cannot participate to the election but even when it is
so, the legal authorities never ask the voter to report veriable evidence on these allegations.
Therefore, such a choice is basically opened to any voter who wants to use that opportunity.
Note however that such a transfer is always unconditional, that is the recipient of the voting
power of the donator is free to make the use he wants of the extra ballot. If the vote is secret,
there is no alternative to that possibility but even when the vote is not secret (this often happens
in committees) freedom is the rule.
The purpose of this note is to examine the implications of that strategic option on the
functioning of a voting rule. After all, sophisticated voters could possibly use that option to
change the electoral outcome in a direction that is protable to them but depart from the
general interest as dened by the original social choice function. What social choice functions
(voting rules) are (if any) vulnerable to this "manipulation" where manipulation refers to the
fact that the electoral outcome resulting from the transfer operation between the two voters
(the voter who gives his vote and the voter who accepts it) is prefered by these two voters to
the original electoral outcome1? Hereafter, we refer to that possibility as the paradox of the
proxy voting2.
1This paradox should remind the paradox exhibited by Gale (1974) in the context of markets : by donating
part of his endowment to another trader, a trader may change the walrasian outcome in such a way that these
two traders are better o at the expense of the other traders. Similarly, the no show strategy studied by Moulin
(1988) echoes the strategic destruction by a trader of a fraction of his endowments as abstention means that a
voter refuses to use his political endowment.
2The Schelling's paradox reported in Nalebu deals with another peculiarity. Indeed, it could be the case
that, as a result of this transfer operation, the new electoral outcome goes up with respect to the donator'
preference (he can even gets his top outcome) while it goes down with respect to the recipient preference (the
outcome can move all the way from top to bottom). If we only require that there do not exist proles and
pair of individuals such that at least, the recipient is happy to receive the transfer, we are getting close to a
monotonicity condition. Indeed that requirement means that for all possible proles and all pair of individuals,
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We show, in section 3, that all Condorcet consistent social choice functions are vulnerable
to this manipulation. Then in section 4, we show that another important family of social choice
functions implementable via backward induction suers from the same weakness. We conclude
by exhibiting a simple social choice function that is not vulnerable to that manipulation but
which is, unfortunately, not implementable via backward induction.
2 Notations and Denitions
The collective choice problems considered in this paper are described by the following inputs:
a nite set of alternatives A with jAj  m  3, a nite set of voters N with jN j  n  2 and a
prole P = (P1; P2; :::; Pn) of preferences where Pi denotes the preference of voter i. We assume
that Pi is a linear order over A (i.e. a complete, transitive and anti-symmetric binary relation)
and denote by L the set of linear orders over A. A social choice function is a mapping F from
Ln into A: F (P ) denotes the social choice made by F when the prole of preferences is P .
To each P 2 Ln and a; b 2 A Ln with a 6= b ,we attach the number n(a; b; P )  jfi 2 N : aPibgj.
This denes the majority relation M(P ) as follows aM(P )b i n(a; b; P ) > n(b; a; P ). An alter-
native a is a Condorcet winner for P if: aM(P )b for all b 2 A; b 6= a. A social choice function
F is Condorcet consistent if F (P ) = a whenever a is a Condorcet winner for P .
A social choice function F is a binary procedure if there exists a binary tree i.e. a triple
 = (M;'; ) where M is a nite set of nodes with a distinguished node m0 (the origin of
the tree), ' is a mapping M ! M (' associates each node with its predecessor) such that
'(m) = m i m = m0 and '
 1(m) is a set which is either the empty set or consists of exactly
two elements (nodes wich have no successors are called terminal nodes and denoted by Z) and
is an onto mapping Z ! A. If n is odd3, a binary tree  induces a social choice function
F.F(P ) i s computed recursively as follows : pick two terminal nodes m and m
0 with a
common predecessor m00 = ' (m) = '(m0) and concatenate m and m0 into a single terminal
node m00 with  (m00) =  (m) if  (m)M(P ) (m0) and  (m00) =  (m0) if  (m0)M(P ) (m).
Similarly, a social choice function F is implementable via backward induction if there exists a
nite extensive game form4   = (M; ; ) such that for all P 2 Ln, F (P ) is equal to the
either a transfer leaves the outcome unchanged or it deteroriates the well being of the recipient. Note however
that this threat is deterred as soon as the voters are rational and free to accept or refuse a proxy. The implications
of a stronger form of a property of monotonicity of that kind is explored in a stimulating paper by Sprumont
(1993).
3If n is odd, the majority relation M(P ) is complete. If the majority relation M(P ) is not complete, then
an additional device has to be introduced to break the ties. We will not need it in our note.
4The denition of a nite extensive form game is space consuming and will be avoided here as we dont need
it in this note. We refer the reader to Dutta and Sen (1993) for a complete denition. Strategic behavior in such
setting is often refered to as sophisticated voting (Farquharson (1969)). Social choice functions constructed via
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backward induction solution of  at P . For all proles P 2 Ln and any proper subset B  A
containing at least two elements, we say that B is an adjacent set of P if for all b; b0 2 B, for
all a 2 AnB, for all i 2 N , aPib i aPib. Let PB  Ln the set of proles having B as an
adjacent set. A social choice function F satises adjacency if for all B  A, for all P; P 0 2 PB,
if for all i 2 N , Pi and Pi agree on AnB, then: (i) F (P ) 2 AnB ) F (P 0) = F (P ) and (ii)
F (P ) 2 B ) F (P 0) 2 B. It has been demonstrated by Dutta and Sen (1993) and Moulin
(1986) that if F is implementable via backward induction, then F satises adjacency.
3 Schelling's Paradox of the Departing Voter
The story reported as puzzle 5 in Nalebu (1988) and credited by him to Tom Schelling is
described as follows: " A ve-man board is to elect one of its members chairman by a procedure
involving successive majority votes. Anderson, rst in alphabetical order, will be paired against
Barnes; the winner of that vote will be paired against Carlson, the winner then paired against
Davis, and the winner of that paired against Evans. The winner of this fourth and nal ballot
will be declared chairman. Everyone knows everyone else's preferences. Everyone wants to be
chairman.". In my notations, the set A contains ve alternatives : A;B;C;D and E. The
prole of preferences P is assumed to be as follows
Anderson (1): AP1BP1CP1DP1E
Barnes (2): BP2AP2EP2DP2C
Carlson (3): CP3DP3AP3EP3B
Davis (4): DP4BP4AP4EP4C
Evans (5): EP5DP5BP5CP5A
"All ve committee members have perfect foresight and vote strategically. Who will win
?...Now, for the Schelling llip, Anderson is forced to miss the meeting. He is allowed to transfer
his vote to someone else. This transfer must be unconditional in that Anderson is not allowed
to specify how the receiver must vote. To whom should Anderson give his vote and what do
you expect will happen ?"
an extensive game form or a binary tree are dominance solvable as dened by Moulin (1979,1994).
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The binary tree which is considered in Schelling's setting is the usual amendment procedure
which is well documented in political science. The social choice F (P ) is the (unique) equilibrium
outcome of the extensive form game resulting from the binary tree depicted on gure 1 and the
prole P ; equilibrium means iterative elimination of dominated strategies.
Insert gure 1 about here
Shepsle and Weingast (1984) have discovered a nice algorithm to compute this equilibrium.
It only depends upon the majority relation T (P ) and works as follows in our case. The social
choice F (P ) is the last element of the following nite sequence:
x1 = E
x2 = E if ET (P )D and x2 = D if DT (P )E
x3 = C if CT (P )x2 and CT (P )x1:Otherwise x3 = x2:
x4 = B if BT (P )x3; BT (P )x2 and BT (P )x1:Otherwise x4 = x3:
x5 = A if AT (P )x4; AT (P )x3; AT (P )x2 and CT (P )x1:Otherwise x5 = x4:
We observe that T (P ) despicted below admits D as a Condorcet winner.
Insert Figure 2 about here
It follows immediately that F (P ) = D. Let us now compute F (P j) for each of the four
proles P j j = 2; 3; 4; 5 obtained by replacing P1 by either P2, P3; P4 or P5. The tournaments
T (P 2); T (P 3); T (P 4) and T (P 5) are depicted on gures 3, 4 , 5 and 6 below.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Insert Figure 4 about here
Insert Figure 5 about here
Insert Figure 6 about here
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Applying repeatedly the Shepsle-Weinsgast's algorithm lead to:
F (P 2) = F (P2; P2; P3; P4; P5) = B
F (P 3) = F (P3; P2; P3; P4; P5) = D
F (P 4) = F (P4; P2; P3; P4; P5) = D
F (P 5) = F (P5; P2; P3; P4; P5) = A
We note that if the vote of Anderson is transfered to Evans, then Anderson gets elected:
the best outcome for him but the worst outcome for Evans. I think that this is the paradoxical
feature of the new equilibrium outcome that Schelling wanted to emphasize in his example.
Paradoxical, as we intuitively expect that with one additional vote Evans's situation would see
his situation improved. The extreme violation of an expected monotonicity property displayed
by this outcome comes as a surprise. While intringuing, note however since Evans is assumed
to be rational, he will anticipate the consequences of the transfer and refuse it.
When Anderson transfers his vote to Barnes, the new outcome is B which is the best for
Barnes and second to best for Anderson. In that case, both A and B are happy with the
electoral outcome resulting from the transfer. If we assume that a voter cannot be forced to
vote on behalf of somebody else, then the transfer will be implemented i the two parties
nd protable to do so. This leads to the following denition. A social choice function F is
vulnerable to the proxy voting paradox if there exists P in Ln and i; j in N such that :
F (Pj; P i)PiF (P ) and F (Pj; P i)PjF (P ) (1)
This reduced form denition5 is easier to interpret when the social choice outcome is the
equilibrium outcome of a game form as in the Schelling's setting. It simply means that it is
never the case in this game that there exists a pair of players i and j such that j nds protable
to leave the game and let j play for him each time he was supposed to play. Protable meaning
that the new equilibrium outcome is preferred by i and j to the old one. In some sense, the
transfer operation can also be seen as a manipulation of a very specic type by a coalition of
size two.
We insist here on the fact that this vulnerability is bad news for those who expected to exit
from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility result by considering dominance solvable game
forms. Indeed, the analysis of Schelling's example as well as the results reported in the next
section show that they are vulnerable to another form of manipulation involving two players
5This transfer operation is described by moving from a game form with n players to a game with n   1
players where one of the original player has inherated all the decision nodes of the departing player.
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but quite straightforward to implement. The following simple example illustrates the proxy
paradox. Suppose that there are three voters who have to decide who will act as chairman
among the three. Their preferences display the usual Condorcet cycle pattern:
Anderson (1): AP1BP1C
Barnes (2): BP2CP2A
Carlson (3): CP3AP3B
Anderson is paired against Barnes; the winner of that vote is paired against Carlson. The
winner of this second and nal ballot will be declared chairman. The simple binary tree de-
scribing this game is depicted on gure 7 below.
Insert Figure 7 here
The backward solution works as follows. If A passes the rst round, then it is defeated at
the second by C. If instead, B passes the second round it defeats C. So the three sophisticated
voters understand that the real choice at the rst round is between C and B. Since there is a
majority in favor of B, B wins. Carlson is unhappy with that outcome. He would like to commit
himself to vote A if A passes the rst round but this promise is not credible if he participates
to the vote as, once the second round round has been reached, his dominant strategy is to vote
for C. But if by pretending being unable to participate to the meeting, he gives a proxy to
Anderson, he eliminates that issue as A becomes a Condorcet winner and is elected. In some
sense, proxy is a credible way to commit to another plan of action.
The Schelling's violation of monotonicity is something dierent but related to the proxy
issue which motivated that paper. His monotonicity property is a weak version of a property
introduced by Sprumont (1993) under the heading "Closer Preferences Better" (CPB). Infor-
mally, Sprumont denes a a social function to satisfy CPB if for any prole P and any pair
i and j of voters, moving to a prole P 0 where all the preferences are unchanged, except the
preference of voter j which is now closer (in a well dened sense) to the preference of voter i;
does not hurt voter i. Schelling deals with the special case of identity which is the extreme
form of closeness because the distance between the two voters is equal to 0. Let us say6 that a
social choice function is vulnerable to the Schelling/Sprumont monotonicity paradox if if there
exists P in Ln and i; j in N such that :
6This terminology is mine.
7
F (P )PjF (Pj; P i) (2)
or even , a bit more demanding7:
F (P )PjF (Pj; P i)PiF (P ) (3)
Once again, this monotonicity paradox has little to do with strategic behavior as we dont
expect j to accept a proxy from i under the conditions (2) or (3). But it calls the attention on
the fact that, in spite of appearances, it may not be a good idea for a voter to accept to vote
on behalf of somebody else.
It is important also to point out8 that the proxy paradox and the Schelling/Sprumont
paradox are logically unrelated to the twin paradox introduced by Moulin(1988). The dierence
lies in the fact that to be properly dened, the twin paradox involves social choice functions
over a variable electorate. Without being too formal, say that a social choice function suers
from the twin paradox if there exists n, P 2 Ln and i such that F (P )PiF (P; Pi): it means
that given P , voter i does not welcome the arrival/partipation of a voter who has identical
preferences to him. There exist social choice functions which are suering from the proxy
paradox or Schelling/Sprumont paradox but not from the twin paradox: a nice family is the
class of scoring functions. Indeed, Sprumont shows that scoring functions suer from the
Schelling/Sprumont paradox. However, they dont suer from the twin paradox. There also
exist social choice functions who do not suer from the Schelling/Sprumont or Proxy paradox
but suer from the twin paradox. While articial, here is an example. Consider two voters, say
1 and 2, and dene F (P ) to be the top choice of P1 is n is even and the top choice of P2 if n is
odd. The function is immuned to the Schelling/Sprumont paradox and proxy paradox because
for a xed value of n, F is dictatorial. But it is not immuned to the twin paradox since a voter
may change the identity of the dictator by participating or not in the election. If he is a twin
of voter 1 but n is odd, the best thing he has to do is not to show up.
4 Condorcet
The main purpose of this section is to prove that the situation exhibited in the preceding section
is not exceptional as soon as the social choice function is Condorcet consistent
7Consistent with Schelling's story, we could even consider this stronger form : there exists P in Ln and i; j
in N such that F (Pj ; P i) is the top element of Pi and F (Pj ; P i) is the bottom element of Pj . In Schelling's
story, F (P ) is also almost the best element of Pj !
8I am grateful to Hannu Nurmi for raising this question.
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Proposition 1 If n  15, then all Condorcet social choice functions are vulnerable to the
proxy voting paradox
Proof9
Let us prove that under the stated conditions, the social choice function is vulnerable to the
proxy voting paradox.
Let a; b; c 2 A and for any prole P 2 Ln where for every voter the alternatives a, b and c
occupy the rst three positions, denote:
N1(P )  fi 2 N : aPibPicg
N2(P )  fi 2 N : bPiaPicg
N3(P )  fi 2 N : bPicPiag
N4(P )  fi 2 N : cPibPiag
N5(P )  fi 2 N : cPiaPibg
N6(P )  fi 2 N : aPicPibg
Let nj(P ) be the size of N j(P ) for j = 1; :::; 6.
Case 1 : n is a multiple of 3
Let P be such that n1(P ) = n3(P ) = n5(P ) = n 3
3
and n2(P ) = n4(P ) = n6(P ) = 1.
Suppose that F (P ) = a. Let P 0 be the prole obtained from P by shifting one voter, say i,
from N1(P ) to N6(P ). We must have F (P 0) = a. Otherwise, at prole P 0, if i transfers his
vote to any voter j still in N1(P ), we obtain : aPiF (P
0) and aPjF (P 0). By shifting stepwise
any voter in N1(P ) until only one is left, we obtain a prole P 00 such that:
F (P 00) = a, n(c; a; P 00) = n 3
3
+ 1 + n 3
3
= 2n 3
3
; n(c; b; P 00) = n 3
3
+ 1 + n 3
3
+ 1  1 = 2n 3
3
and n(c; x; P 00) = n for all x 2 An fa; b; cg. Since n  15, we deduce that c is a Condorcet
winner and therefore F (P 00) = c. Contradiction.
We can conduct a similar reasoning in the case where F (P ) = b or F (P ) = c. When
F (P ) = x
9This simple but elegant argument is due to Sprumont (1993, proposition B) and reproduced here for the sake
of completeness. It shows that under the stated conditions the Condorcet social choice functions are vulnerable
the Schelling/Srumonts monotonicity paradox.
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Case 2: n  1 is a multiple of 3
Let P be such that n1(P ) = n 7
3
and n3(P ) = n5(P ) = n 4
3
; n2(P ) = n6(P ) = 2 and
n4(P ) = 1. If F (P ) = a, then we construct P 00 as in case 1 by shifting all but one voters
from N1(P ) to N6(P ). Then we obtain : F (P 00) = a. However, n(c; a; P 00) = n 4
3
+ 1 + n 4
3
=
2n 5
3
; n(c; b; P 00) = 1+ n 4
3
+2+ n 7
3
 1 = 2n 5
3
and n(c; x; P 00) = n for all x 2 An fa; b; cg. Since
n  15, we deduce that c is a Condorcet winner and therefore F (P 00) = c. A contradiction.
If F (P ) = b, we construct a prole P 00 as in case 1 by shifting all but one voters from
N3(P ) to N2(P ). Then, we obtain : F (P 00) = b. However, n(a; b; P 00) = n 7
3
+ n 4
3
+ 2 =
2n 5
3
; n(a; c; P 00) = n 8
3
+ 2 + n 8
3
  1 + 2 = 2n 7
3
and n(c; x; P 00) = n for all x 2 An fa; b; cg.
Since n  15, we deduce that a is a Condorcet winner and therefore F (P 00) = a. Contradiction.
If F (P ) = c, we construct a prole P 00 as in case 1 by shifting all but one voters from N5(P )
to N4(P ). Then, we obtain : F (P 00) = c. However, n(b; a; P 00) = 2 + n 4
3
+ 2 + 1 + n 4
3
  1 =
2n+3
3
; n(b; c; P 00) = n 7
3
+ 2 + n 4
3
= 2n 5
3
and n(c; x; P 00) = n for all x 2 An fa; b; cg. Since
n  15, we deduce that b is a Condorcet winner and therefore F (P 00) = b. Contradiction.
Case 3: n  2 is a multiple of 3
Let P be such that n1(P ) = n3(P ) = n 8
3
, n5(P ) = n 5
3
; n2(P ) = 3 and n4(P ) = n6(P ) = 2:
If F (P ) = a, then we construct P 00 as in case 1 by shifting all but one voters from N1(P ) to
N6(P ). Then we obtain : F (P 00) = a. However, n(c; a; P 00) = n 8
3
+2+ n 5
3
= 2n 7
3
; n(c; b; P 00) =
2 + n 5
3
+ 2 + n 8
3
  1 = 2n 4
3
and n(c; x; P 00) = n for all x 2 An fa; b; cg. Since n  15, we
deduce that c is a Condorcet winner and therefore F (P 00) = c. A contradiction.
If F (P ) = b, we construct a prole P 00 as in case 1 by shifting all but one voters from
N3(P ) to N2(P ). Then, we obtain : F (P 00) = b. However, n(a; b; P 00) = n 8
3
+ n 5
3
+ 2 =
2n 7
3
; n(a; c; P 00) = n 7
3
+ 2 + n 4
3
  1 + 2 = 2n 2
3
and n(c; x; P 00) = n for all x 2 An fa; b; cg.
Since n  15, we deduce that a is a Condorcet winner and therefore F (P 00) = a. Contradiction.
If F (P ) = c, we construct a prole P 00 as in case 1 by shifting all but one voters from N5(P )
to N4(P ). Then, we obtain : F (P 00) = c. However, n(b; a; P 00) = 3 + n 8
3
+ 2 + n 5
3
  1 =
2n 1
3
; n(b; c; P 00) = n 8
3
+ 3 + n 8
3
= 2n 7
3
and n(c; x; P 00) = n for all x 2 An fa; b; cg. Since
n  15, we deduce that b is a Condorcet winner and therefore F (P 00) = b. Contradiction. 
The proposition does not say that n  15 is necessary for the result to hold true for the
proxy voting paradox . As seen at the end of the preceding section, the diculty shows up
already with n = 3. On the other hand, some minimal value of n is needed for the Schelling
monotonicity paradox to show up. For n = 3, no Condorcet consistent social choice function
is vulnerable to that paradox. Indeed, if one voter transfer his vote to another voter, then the
top outcome of the recipient is a Condorcet winner.
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5 Extensions and Open Problem
The Condorcet consistent social choice functions are not the only ones vulnerable to the proxy
voting paradox. In this section, we show that another important class of social choice functions
known as voting by successive veto (Moulin (1983)) is also vulnerable to this paradox10. Then,
we show that there are social choice function which are immuned to that paradox for any
number of voters and alternatives. But we also show that the particular social choice function
exhibited to make that point is not implementable via backward induction. We conclude by an
open problem.
Voting by successive veto is dened as follows. Let  be a mapping from f1; 2; :::;m  1g
into N . To  is attached the perfect information extensive game form dened informally as
follows : player (1) starts by vetoing one alternative out of the m alternatives, player (2)
moves then by vetoing one alternative among the m   1 remaining alternatives, player (3)
moves next by vetoing one alternative among the m 2 remaining alternatives and so on. After
m   2 rounds, one player is left with a veto among the remaining two alternatives. For each
P , the backward induction solution V(P ) is well dened. In what follows , we will use the
following theorem demonstrated by Moulin (1981) and known as the mirror image theorem.
Let  be the sequence from f1; 2; :::;m  1g into N dened as follows : (1) = (m   1);
(2) = (m   2); :::; (m   1) = (1). Let S(P ) be the sincere solution attached to P
and dened as follows: voter (1) eliminates his worst alternative, (2) eliminates his worst
alternative among the m 1 remaining alternatives and so on. The mirror image theorem states
that V(P ) = S(P ).
Proposition 2 If j f1; 2; :::;m  1gj  3 (which implies n  3 and m  4) then all voting
by successive vetos social choice functions are vulnerable to the proxy voting paradox.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let  (1) = 1 and k be the smallest integer such that  (k) 6=
1 and assume without loss of generality that  (k) = 2. Let k0 be the smallest integer larger than
k and such that  (k0) 6= 1 and  (k0) 6= 2. Assume without loss of generality that  (k0) = 3. Fi-
nally, let us denote by qi the cardinality of the sets fj 2 f1; 2; :::;m  1g :  (j) = i and j > k0g
for i = 1; 2; 3 and let fB1; B2; B3; B4g be a collection of pairwise disjoint sets inAn fa1; a2; a3; a4g11
where fa1; a2; a3; a4g is an arbitrary quadruple in A such that:
jBij = qi for i = 1; 2; 3
jB4j = jfj 2 f1; 2; :::;m  1g :  (j) =2 f1; 2; 3ggj
10We could also import proposition C in Sprumont stating that all strict scoring methods are exposed to the
Schelling/Sprumont paradoxes to show that they also suer from the proxy paradox.
11If k0 = m  1, and therefore in particular when m = 4, these sets are empty.
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Let A1; A2 be two disjoint sets in An fa1; a2; a3; a4g [B1 [B2 [B3 [B4 such that:
jAij = jfj 2 f1; 2; :::;m  1g :  (j) = i and k > k0gj   1 for i = 1; 2
Consider the prole:
a1P1a2P1a3P1A2P1A1P1a4P1B4P1B1P1B2P1B3
a4P2a3P2A1P2a1P2A2P2a2P2B4P2B2P2B3P2B1
a1P3a3P3a4P3A1P3A2P3a2P3B4P3B2P3B1P3B2
Arbitrary PiB4 for i  4
From the mirror image theorem, we deduce that:
V(P ) = a3
Now let player 3 transfers his vote to voter 1 i.e. let P 0 = (P1; P2; P1; P4; :::; Pn). Using the
mirror image theorem again, we obtain:
V(P
0) = a1
Since a1P1a3 and a1P3a3, we have shown that V is vulnerable to the proxy voting paradox

In the case where m = 4 and n = 3, the successive veto game form is depicted on gure 8.
Insert Figure 8 here
The above prole writes here:
a1P1a2P1a3P1a4
a4P2a3P2a1P2a2
a1P3a3P3a4P3a2
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What is happening here is that by ceding his veto to 1, 3 has now a credible threat not to
veto a2 with the last veto. Thus voter 2 must veto a2. If instead voter 3 does not cede his veto
and participate to the procedure, the other voters anticipate that a2 will be vetoed.
It is interesting to remark that voting by successive vetos is also vulnerable to the Schelling
monotonicity paradox. If instead of the prole considered above, we consider the prole P
below:
a1P1a2P1a3P1a4
a3P2a2P2a1P2a4
a2P3a4P3a1P3a3
we check that V(P ) = a1 while if voter 3 transfers his vote to voter 1 i.e. if we move to
P 0 = (P1; P2; P1), then V(P 0) = a2: 3 gets his best outcome while voter 1 is worse o.
We may wonder to which extend there exists for all n and m, social choice functions F such
that there does not exist prole P and individuals i and j for which there does not exist P in
Ln and i; j in N such that F (Pj; P i)PiF (P ) and F (Pj; P i)PjF (P ). That such social exist is
illustrated by the following simple construction. Let  be a linear order over the set L of m!
linear orders and let F(P ) be dened as the top alternative of the largest (according to  )
order among the orders Pi i = 1; :::; n. Clearly F is proxy-proof. Note also that it is ecient
and anonymous. But it is not implementable via backward induction as it does not satisfy12 the
adjacency property which is a necessary property for implementation via backward induction
(Dutta and Sen (1993), Moulin (1986)).
We leave as open problems the following two questions. Do there exist social functions
which are anonymous, with a range of cardinality greater than 213, implementable via backward
induction and not vulnerable to the proxy voting paradox ? Do there exist anonymous, with
a range of cardinality greater than 2 social choice functions F such that for all for all P 2 Ln
and all i; j 2 N : either F (Pj; P i) = F (P ) or F (Pj; P i)PjF (P ) ?
12The argument is relegated in the appendix.
13Without anonymity, it is easy to construct non dictatorial social choice functions such that the two paradoxes
can be avoided. Pick two xed individuals, say 1 and 2 and let F (P ) be the top element of P1 among all the
m   1 alternatives that remain after the elimination of the bottom element of P2. On the other hand, if the
range has only two elements then all monotonic social choice functions are immuned to the two paradoxes.
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6 Appendix : Proof that the Social Choice Function F
Violates the Adjacency Property
Let  be an arbitrary ordering of L and let a; b and c be three alternatives. Consider the six
preferences where a; b; c are on top and the alternatives in An fa; b; cg are below in a prescribed
order. Hereafter, we restrict to proles with preferences limited to these six types. Suppose
that the social choice function F described above satises the adjacency property. Without
loss of generality suppose that that the order abc comes rst in 
If cab is second then F(P ) = c whenever the prole P contains exclusively preference abc
and preferences cab. The preference bac comes after abc and cab. If P 0 is a prole where the
voters with preference abc in P have preference bac in P 0 then F(P 0) = b. This contradicts
adjacency as fa; bg is an adjacent set for P and P 0:
If cba is second then F(P ) = c whenever the prole P contains exclusively preference abc
and preferences cba. The preference bac comes after abc and cab. If P 0 is a prole where the
voters with preference abc in P have preference bac in P 0 then F(P 0) = b. This contradicts
adjacency as fa; bg is an adjacent set for P and P 0.
If bca is second then F(P ) = b whenever the prole P contains exclusively preference abc
and preferences bca. The preference acb comes after abc and cab. If P 0 is a prole where the
voters with preference abc in P have preference acb in P 0 then F(P 0) = a. This contradicts
adjacency as fb; cg is an adjacent set for P and P 0
Therefore, only the orders acb and bac can occupy the second position
Case 1 acb is second
We have four possibilities for the third position
- bac is third. Then cab is after abc, acb and bac. Take a prole P with preferences either
acb or bac. then F(P ) = b. Now construct a prole P 0 where voters with acb in P have now
cab. Then F(P 0) = c. This contradicts adjacency as fa; cg is an adjacent set.
- bca is third. Then cab is after abc, acb and bca. Take a prole P with preferences either
acb or bca. then F(P ) = b. Now construct a prole P 0 where voters with acb in P have now
cab. Then F(P 0) = c. This contradicts adjacency as fa; cg is an adjacent set.
- cab is third. Then bac is after abc, acb and cab. Take a prole P with preferences either
abc orcab. then F(P ) = c. Now construct a prole P 0 where voters with abc in P have now
bac. Then F(P 0) = b. This contradicts adjacency as fa; bg is an adjacent set.
- cba is third. Then bac is after abc, acb and cba. Take a prole P with preferences either
abc or cab. then F(P ) = c. Now construct a prole P 0 where voters with abc in P have now
bac. Then F(P 0) = b. This contradicts adjacency as fa; bg is an adjacent set.
Case 2 bac is second
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We have four posibilities for the third position.
- acb is third. Then bca is after abc, bac and acb. Take a prole P with preferences either
bac or acb. then F(P ) = a. Now construct a prole P 0 where voters with bac in P have now
bca. Then F(P 0) = b. This contradicts adjacency as fa; cg is an adjacent set.
- cab is third. Then bca is after abc, bac and cab. Take a prole P with preferences either
bac or cab. then F(P ) = c. Now construct a prole P 0 where voters with bac in P have now
bca. Then F(P 0) = b. This contradicts adjacency as fa; cg is an adjacent set.
- cba is third. Then acb is after abc, bac and cba. Take a prole P with preferences either
abc or cba. then F(P ) = c. Now construct a prole P 0 where voters with abc in P have now
acb. Then F(P 0) = a. This contradicts adjacency as fb; cg is an adjacent set.
- bca is third. Then acb is after abc, bac and bca. Take a prole P with preferences either
abc or bca. then F(P ) = b. Now construct a prole P 0 where voters with abc in P have now
acb. Then F(P 0) = a. This contradicts adjacency as fb; cg is an adjacent set.
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